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INTRODUCTION
HE Declaratory Judgment Act is a statute designed to give parties
uncertain of their legal rights the ability to obtain a fair and impar-
tial determination of those rights.' Any action for declaratory re-
lief must meet certain minimum jurisdictional requirements, but,
interestingly, even if the case meets those requirements, the Act expressly
gives courts the discretion to accept or decline the case. 2 When, then,
should a court take such a case, and when should it decline? This ques-
tion is particularly important in patent cases given the frequency with
which declaratory relief actions arise in patent litigation.
3
Consider the following scenario: Patentee contacts Manufacturer be-
cause she believes that her patent covers a component found in Manufac-
turer's product. Manufacturer believes that he does not infringe the
patent and, in any event, that the patent is invalid. Negotiations between
the parties stall. Manufacturer is now in a quandary: if his product in-
fringes the patent, then damages increase substantially with every day the
product remains on the market.4 On the other hand, it is extremely costly
and inefficient for Manufacturer to discontinue his product prematurely if
the product does not infringe. So, rather than wait and see if Patentee
will sue him for infringement, Manufacturer preemptively files an action
for declaratory relief asking the court to declare the patent non-infringed
and/or invalid. Should the court take the case? Should the court be more
inclined to take the case if it threatens the intangible assets of an indige-
nous population, as described by Professor Danielle Conway in this Sym-
posium Issue?5 Unfortunately both the Federal Circuit6 and the Supreme
Court have provided little guidance to answer these questions. 7
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2010) ("In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ...
any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought."); see Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating
Patent Litigants' Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 407,
408-09 (2007) (explaining that the Declaratory Judgment Act is meant "to alleviate the
uncertainty faced by parties, such as alleged patent infringers").
2. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) ("Since its inception, the De-
claratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and sub-
stantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.").
3. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 284, 1 requires courts to award, upon a finding of patent infringe-
ment, "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
This includes compensatory damages for the actual monetary loss suffered. JANICE M.
MUELLER, PATENT LAW 496 (3d ed. 2009).
5. See Danielle M. Conway, Promoting Indigenous Innovation, Enterprise, and Entre-
preneurship through the Licensing of Article 31 Indigenous Assets and Resources, 64 SMU
L. REV. 1095, 1107 (2011).
6. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive nationwide juris-
diction over appeals in cases where the well pleaded complaint asserts a cause of action
arising under the patent laws. MUELLER, supra note 4, at 38.
7. See, e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1288
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that "[i]f a district court's decision is consistent with the purposes
of the Declaratory Judgment Act and considerations of wise judicial administration, it may
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Some scholars have suggested that when considering whether to accept
a declaratory relief action, courts should focus on the tone and character
of the parties' bargaining conduct. 8 Declaratory relief may be warranted
if, for example, Patentee sent letters to Manufacturer with threatening
and aggressive language, or Patentee had already sued Manufacturer's
main competitor over the same patent.9 Emphasizing the parties' con-
duct, however, risks manipulation and gamesmanship.10
This Article contends that a crucial factor that substantially impacts the
propriety of a grant of declaratory relief in a patent dispute, and one that
has not been examined by the courts and the academic literature, is the
nature of the patent itself, which lies at the heart of the dispute. More
specifically, this Article argues that courts need to consider whether adju-
dicating particular patents would further fairness and innovation.
Patents often contain vague language that creates uncertainty regard-
ing their claims' scope and value." These kinds of patents are unjust
because they do not give the public fair notice of the patents' bounda-
ries.12 Patent-holders can essentially tell the public: "I won't (or can't)
tell you where the boundary is, but put one foot over where I think it is
exercise its discretion to dismiss (or stay) the case" but not providing any specific guidance
on how to exercise this discretion); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co,, 929 F.2d 670,
673 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting "competing policy considerations of, on the one hand, conserv-
ing limited judicial resources by declining jurisdiction and, on the other hand, utilizing the
services of a court by permitting a party threatened with legal action to obtain an early
adjudication of its rights and liabilities"); see also David I. Levine & Charles E. Belle,
Declaratory Relief After MedImmune, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 491, 527-33 (2010) (not-
ing courts are not using their discretion to support decisions to accept or decline declara-
tory relief patent actions as often as they could). But cf. Dolak, supra note 1, at 407-08
(arguing that the Federal Circuit is incorrectly blurring the distinction between constitu-
tional requirements and discretion and that courts should better separate their analyses of
the jurisdictional and prudential bases for justifiability under the Declaratory Judgment
Act).
8. See Lorelei Ritchie De Larena, Re-Evaluating Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction
in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 988-89 (2008) (when exercising their
discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act, courts should consider (1) contact and
correspondence between parties, (2) extent of license negotiations between parties, (3)
prior conduct by declaratory judgment defendant, and (4) post-filing conduct by declara-
tory judgment defendant); Paul J. LaVanway, Jr., Note, Patent Licensing and Discretion:
Reevaluating the Discretionary Prong of Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction After MedIm-
mune, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1966, 1991-98 (2008) (arguing that when exercising their discre-
tion under the Declaratory Judgment Act courts should consider "the scope and content of
communications between the parties, the extent of ongoing negotiations between parties,
and the size of the parties").
9. See De Larena, supra note 8, at 944.
10. But cf Lisa A. Dolak, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 932-33 (1997) (describing situation
where patentee could avoid declaratory relief by carefully considering its vocabulary when
communicating with the potential infringer and further arguing that courts would need to
"unduly scrutinize the patentee's choice of words for evidence of 'threats"').
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIC-riONARY 1228 (1979) (defining "justice" as, in-
ter alia, "the quality of being... impartial[ ] or fair"); BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 942 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining "justice" as "[t]he fair and proper administration of laws"). Although
this Article focuses on aspects of justice such as fairness and impartiality, scholars have
also considered whether patents promote the progress of justice, for example, by examin-
ing whether "justice [is] served by permitting patent rights to exist and possibly incentivize
research that has been explicitly denied federal funding as unduly controversial, or even
2011]
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and I'll sue you for patent infringement." Unjust patents can impede in-
novation by inhibiting licensing of the patent to parties that can transform
the invention into a commercial product, 13 discouraging other parties
from investing in similar technology due to fears of infringement, 14 and
improperly rewarding the patentee while penalizing deserving follow-on
inventors.' 5 When unjust patents are asserted against potential infring-
ers, their indeterminate boundaries prevent parties from reaching mutu-
ally agreeable solutions because the parties deadlock over mutually
mistaken assumptions regarding the patents' scope and value. 16 This bar-
gaining breakdown often leads to litigation and a request for declaratory
relief.17
The interplay between unjust patents, bargaining breakdown, and inno-
vation needs to be considered when determining whether a declaratory
relief action is appropriate. Specifically, courts should examine whether a
declaratory relief action has been filed because high transaction costs-
arising from an unjust patent-are preventing the parties from reaching
their own bargain.' 8 If so, a court should accept the declaratory relief
action so that the patent's scope can be vetted by an impartial decision-
maker. By explicitly considering these transaction costs, courts can use
their discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act as a policy lever to
address bargaining breakdown in a way that maximizes both private bar-
gaining and innovation.19 Effective use of declaratory relief in this fash-
immoral[.]" Cynthia M. Ho, Do Patents Promote the Progress of Justice? Reflections on
Varied Visions of Justice, 36 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 469, 469-72 (2005).
13. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
21 (2005) (arguing that when patents "convey little information about the potential com-
mercial value of the invention ... third parties cannot possibly determine the value of the
patented invention"); cf Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for
Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 484-85 (2008) (noting traditional patent para-
digm that "patents encourage invention primarily by excluding competitors... or by facili-
tating a market for licenses and assignments so that inventors can sell their ideas to
others," but then arguing that such a paradigm is not applicable to user innovators).
14. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 590 (2009) (noting that
parties "want to use the information that should be disclosed in a patent to design around a
patented invention, learn from it for future research, or improve on the invention, but do
so without infringing the patent itself").
15. Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 158 (2006)
(noting that the "patent reward should be commensurate with the scope of [the inventor's]
innovation," or "the patentee would be unduly rewarded for his invention"); Sean B.
Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 144-45
(2008) (noting risk of rewarding inventors with undue patent scope under current
framework).
16. Cf. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 84-91 (1994) (discussing examples of bar-
gaining breakdown involving blocking patents).
17. Cf Dolak, supra note 10, at 947 (noting that many declaratory relief actions "share
a common factual predicate: the patentee has asserted that a present activity of the poten-
tial infringer invades the patentee's statutory right to exclude").
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. A policy lever can be used to sensitize legal regimes "to the technological and
industrial contexts they regulate so as to avoid either over-rewarding or under-rewarding
innovators." Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Re-
verse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1649 (2002).
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ion resolves the uncertainty the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed
to address and furthers the goals of the patent system by promoting
innovation. 20
Part I introduces the Declaratory Judgment Act and discusses the sub-
stantial discretion courts have under the Act to accept or decline cases.
This Part explains that courts have failed to articulate clear policy objec-
tives to guide this discretion and argues that when deciding whether to
accept or decline a declaratory relief action, courts should consider the
patent-at-issue and whether adjudicating the patent would promote fair-
ness and innovation.
Part II of this Article discusses how patents can conflict with our no-
tions of justice and fair play. This Part also explains the impact of unjust
patents on bargaining and innovation and argues that these effects need
to be considered when deciding whether declaratory relief is appropriate.
Furthermore, since unjust patents have varying impediment effects de-
pending on the industry and technology-at-issue, industry-specific charac-
teristics should also be taken into account.
Part III presents specific public policy concerns that courts need to con-
sider when determining whether adjudicating the patent-at-issue would
promote fairness and innovation. Specifically, unjust patents are more
likely to lead to bargaining breakdown in certain industries, and courts
should broadly grant declaratory relief in such industries because more of
these patents need to be vetted through an impartial decision-maker.
This Part offers an example of how this policy lever could be tailored to
the software industry. This Part concludes by arguing that explicit consid-
eration of the goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the patent sys-
tem in this manner creates efficiencies for both patent owners and
potential infringers.
I. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
The Declaratory Judgment Act states: "In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States . . . may declare
the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought."'/ The
Act is intended to give parties who are uncertain of their legal rights a
way to seek judicial determination of their rights.22 While the Act is ap-
plicable to all areas of the law, part of the impetus behind the Act's pas-
sage was the plight of potential patent infringers. 23 As stated by one of
the Act's supporters during Senate hearings to consider the Act:
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You claim that
you have a patent. What am I going to do about it? There is no way
that I can litigate my right, which I claim, to use that device, except
20. Dolak, supra note 10, at 904, 914.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (emphasis added).
22. Dolak, supra note 1, at 408-09.
23. Id.; LaVanway, supra note 8, at 1968-69.
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by going ahead and using it, and you [the patent holder] can sit back
as long as you please and let me run up just as high a bill of damages
as you wish to have me run up, and then you may sue me for the
damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time in good faith and
on my best judgment, but having no way in the world to find out
whether I had a right to use that device or not.2 4
Although declaratory relief is not limited to patent disputes, it is partic-
ularly important to potential patent infringers because of the magnitude
of possible losses.25 Moreover, studies have demonstrated that potential
infringers who file for declaratory judgment, rather than waiting to be
sued by the patentee, have a significantly higher chance of winning at
trial.26 Indeed, approximately fourteen percent of patent cases that reach
trial are declaratory judgment actions brought by potential infringers. 27
The prominence of declaratory judgment actions in patent litigation
makes for a compelling argument to further explore the potential of the
Declaratory Judgment Act as a policy lever to advance the goals of the
patent system.
A. "No LIMITING PRINCIPLE WHATSOVER"
In order for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a declara-
tory relief action, the parties must establish the existence of "a case of
actual controversy. ' '2 8 Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit applied a two-
prong test to determine whether an actual controversy existed in suits
24. Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
70th Cong. 35 (1928). For additional information on the legislative history of the Declara-
tory Judgment Act, see Dolak, supra note 1, at 408 n.6. See also Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v.
Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v.
Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) ("(A] patent owner.., attempts extra-
judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect the compet-
itive environment of the business community with uncertainty and insecurity .... Before
the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless and immobile so long
as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue. After the Act, those competitors
were no longer restricted to an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing
potential liability for patent infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could
clear the air by suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests."); Red Wing
Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc., 846 F.2d at 735) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("Before the Declaratory Judgment Act, competitors victimized by scare-the-customer-
and-run tactics were rendered helpless and immobile so long as the patent owner refused
to grasp the nettle and sue.").
25. The mean defendant in an infringement case loses 3% of its market value, or $28.7
million, upon the filing of an infringement suit against it. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J.
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVA-
TORS AT RISK 56, 135-37 (2008); see also LEVINE & BELLE, supra note 7, at 493 ("Actions
for declaratory relief are particularly common in patent litigation because of the large costs
involved and the potential for substantial damages.").
26. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) ("When the patent holder selects the
forum, the patent holder wins 58% of the claims. When the accused infringer brings a
declaratory judgment action and thereby chooses the forum, the patent holder win rate
drops to 44%.").
27. Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
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involving patent infringement. 29 A declaratory judgment plaintiff was re-
quired to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of being sued by the
patentee and to present activity that could constitute infringement or
meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity. 30 The
Supreme Court, however, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,31 re-
jected the first prong of the test (reasonable apprehension of suit)32 and
concluded that it is more appropriate to consider "whether the facts al-
leged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial contro-
versy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judg-
ment. ''33 Dissenting from the decision, Justice Thomas complained that
the test "contain[ed] no limiting principle whatsoever. '34
In the aftermath of MedImmune's "more lenient legal standard" the
Federal Circuit has struggled to define a workable, predictable test for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases. 35 The lower courts
have been instructed to consider the "totality of the circumstances" but
have not been given any specific factors to guide this analysis. 36 As a
result, many lower courts have returned to the Federal Circuit's outdated
pre-MedImmune two-prong test, finding an actual controversy whenever
the declaratory judgment plaintiff's product practices a patent and the
patentee has given an indication that it will enforce its rights.37
To further complicate the analysis, even when jurisdiction is present,
the Declaratory Judgment Act gives courts "unique and substantial dis-
29. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc., 846 F.2d at 736 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
30. Id.
31. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
32. Id. at 132-33 n.11.
33. Id. at 127.
34. Id. at 146 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
36. See Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (stating MedImmune established a "totality of the circumstances" test); Prasco,
LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that a "general
all-the-circumstances test [is used] to establish that an action presents a justiciable Article
III controversy").
37. "[T]he trend is to find an actual controversy, at least where the declaratory judg-
ment plaintiffs product arguably practices a patent and the patentee has given some indi-
cation it will enforce its rights." Diamonds.net LLC v. Idex Online, Ltd., 590 F. Supp. 2d
593, 597-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Post-Medlmmune, there generally must first be some affirm-
ative act by the patent owner relating to enforcement of its patent rights. See, e.g., Prasco,
537 F.3d at 1338-39; SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380-81
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[J]urisdiction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a party
learns of the existence of a patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to
pose a risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by the patentee."). Second, "al-
though a party need not have engaged in the actual manufacture or sale of a potentially
infringing product to obtain a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, there must be a
showing of 'meaningful preparation' for making or using that product." Cat Tech LLC v.
TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 880-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[W]hether there has been mean-
ingful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity remains an important element
in the totality of circumstances which must be considered in determining whether a declar-
atory judgment is appropriate.").
20111
SMU LAW REVIEW
cretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants."' 38 As stated
by the Supreme Court, "[t]he statute's textual commitment to discretion,
and the breadth of leeway we have always understood it to suggest, dis-
tinguish the declaratory judgment context from other areas of the law in
which concepts of discretion surface."'39 Yet neither the Supreme Court
nor the Federal Circuit has instructed lower courts on how to exercise this
important discretion in patent cases. 40 The lack of guidance in this area
led Federal Circuit Judge Bryson to complain that there is "no practical
stopping point short of allowing declaratory judgment actions in virtually
any case" when patent licensing negotiations breakdown.
41
The academic literature has attempted to provide some guidance by
suggesting that courts look to the behavior of the parties. 42 These schol-
ars propose that the history, nature, and extent of the parties' bargaining
conduct should determine whether a court should accept a declaratory
relief action.43 Declaratory relief is warranted if, for example, the charac-
ter and content of the negotiations between the parties is particularly ag-
gressive or the patentee has a history of being an aggressive litigant.
44
The problem with focusing on the parties' conduct, however, is that such
conduct is easily molded by adroit counsel and therefore can be mislead-
ing.45 For example, patentees could avoid declaratory judgment by
merely remaining "cooperative and compliant" during negotiations, and
38. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) (citing Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)); see also Micron Tech., Inc., 518 F.3d at 903.
39. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286-87; see also Innovative Therapies, Inc., 599 F.3d at 1385
("[Tihe discretion afforded to district courts to administer the declaratory judgment prac-
tice is broad.").
40. The Supreme Court has merely stated that the "propriety of declaratory relief in a
particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness informed by the teach-
ings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power." Wil-
ton, 515 U.S. at 287 (citing Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243
(1952)). The Federal Circuit has only stated that "when deciding whether to exercise
[their] discretion, [courts] should decide whether hearing the case would 'serve the objec-
tives for which the Declaratory Judgment Act was created."' Micron Tech., Inc., 518 F.3d
at 903 (citing Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004));
Cat Tech LLC, 528 F.3d at 883 ("Even assuming that the immediacy and reality prerequi-
sites for declaratory judgment relief have been met, the district court's exercise of its de-
claratory judgment authority is discretionary .... In deciding whether to entertain a
declaratory judgment request, a court must determine whether resolving the case serves
the objectives for which the Declaratory Judgment Act was created.").
41. SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., De Larena, supra note 8, at 988; LaVanway, supra note 8, at 1991-98.
43. See De Larena, supra note 8, at 988-89 (when exercising their discretion under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, courts should consider (1) contact and correspondence be-
tween parties, (2) extent of license negotiations between parties, (3) prior conduct by de-
claratory judgment defendant, and (4) post-filing conduct by declaratory judgment
defendant); LaVanway, supra note 8, at 1991-98 (arguing that when exercising their discre-
tion under the Declaratory Judgment Act courts should consider the scope and content of
communications, extent of ongoing negotiations, and size of parties).
44. See De Larena, supra note 8, at 992.
45. But cf. Dolak, supra note 10, at 932-33 (describing a situation where the patentee
could avoid declaratory relief by carefully considering its vocabulary when communicating
with the potential infringer and further arguing that courts would need to "unduly scruti-
nize the patentee's choice of words for evidence of 'threats"').
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potential infringers could trigger declaratory judgment by simply forcing
patentees to answer specific questions during negotiation. 46 A limiting
principle needs to be articulated that is not so easily manipulated.
B. HARNESSING THE COURTS' "UNIQUE AND
SUBSTANTIAL DISCRETION"
This Article contends that the limiting principle can be found in the
courts' "unique and substantial discretion" to accept or decline an action
for declaratory relief.47 The courts must turn their focus away from
whether they have the power to hear a declaratory relief action, to con-
sider whether they should.4 8 If clear policy objectives can be articulated
to guide the exercise of this discretion, it can be used as a policy lever to
resolve uncertainty and promote innovation.
The Declaratory Judgment Act is intended to resolve legal uncer-
tainty.49 In order to understand how this discretion can be used to serve
the objectives of the Act while at the same time promoting innovation,
we need to examine why potential patent infringers file declaratory relief
actions in the first place.50 It is doubtful that a potential infringer would
preemptively seek an "advisory opinion" on "merely contemplated activ-
ity" without first being contacted by a patentee. 5 1 First, given that the
median litigation cost to take a patent case through to the end of discov-
ery is $1.5 million, the costs of initiating such a suit would be enormous
and clearly prohibitive.5 2 Second, given the complexity of modern tech-
nology and the sheer number of possible patents that might cover such
technology, most parties are completely unaware of troublesome patents
46. Dugal S. Sickert et al., Navigating the Declaratory Judgment Minefield to a Patent
License, ACC DOCKET, Sept. 2009, at 54, 60-62 (advising patentees seeking to avoid juris-
diction to "appear cooperative and compliant during negotiations rather than a steadfast
entity standing on its rights" and accused infringers to "do everything possible to show that
both parties have adverse legal interests with regard to the patent" and to "ask questions
during negotiations that will elicit answers sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the 'all
the circumstances' test").
47. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) (citing Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)).
48. Dolak, supra note 1, at 433-34 (arguing that it is important for courts to clearly
distinguish between the jurisdictional and the discretionary factors of the Declaratory
Judgment Act).
49. Id. at 408-09.
50. An examination into the reasons why potential patent infringers file declaratory
relief actions is currently being undertaken by the Author.
51. The jurisdictional inquiry ensures that a party does not seek a declaratory judg-
ment "merely because it would like an advisory opinion on whether it would be liable for
patent infringement if it were to initiate some merely contemplated activity." Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736
(Fed. Cir. 1988)) (citations omitted).
52. The median litigation cost to take a patent case, where there is $1-$25 million at
risk, through to the end of discovery is $1.5 million, and $2.5 million through the end of the
case. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW Ass'N, 2009 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2009);
see also Dolak, supra note 1, at 428 ("[T]he expense and aggravation of patent litigation
would deter purely academic attacks on patents.").
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until the patentee brings one to their attention.53 Finally, the "actual case
or controversy" requirement, even under the current lax standards, would
foreclose any attempt to seek declaratory relief where the patentee has
made no indication of her intent to enforce her rights and the potential
infringer has not made meaningful preparations to make or use a poten-
tially infringing product.5 4
Thus, the classic scenario that leads to a request for declaratory relief is
a failed attempt to license the patent-at-issue. 55 The scenario begins with
the patentee approaching a party that makes or uses a product that ar-
guably practices the patentee's patent, much like the hypothetical pro-
vided in the introduction. Patentee offers the alleged infringer a license.
At this point, the alleged infringer is now on notice that her activities
potentially infringe upon another's patent.56 Since the cost of negotiating
a license is much lower than the cost of litigating a patent, 57 one would
reasonably expect the alleged infringer to examine the patent, determine
whether or not she is infringing, and negotiate the license accordingly. 58
But sometimes, rather than entering into a license, the potential in-
fringer makes the very costly decision to file for a declaratory judgment. 59
Why would she do this?60 As stated by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley,
"[L]itigation ... is usually an outcome due to mutual mistake. If both
parties know the real value of their disputed claims, it is in their interests
53. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
55. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Bryson, J., concurring) (explaining how patent license negotiations can lead to de-
claratory relief actions).
56. Once a potential infringer becomes aware of the patent, she risks liability for will-
ful infringement and increased damages up to three times the amount of the compensatory
award. MUELLER, supra note 4, at 510-15. Companies can be liable for willful infringe-
ment if they learn of a patent and exhibit "objective recklessness" in responding to it. See
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
57. One scholar has estimated the cost of negotiating a patent license at $50,000 per
licensee per patent. Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 (2001).
58. Merges, supra note 16, at 78 (noting that it is more efficient for the rights holder to
set the terms of a license agreement because "(1) there are only two parties to the transac-
tion, and they can easily identify each other; (2) the costs of a transaction between the
parties are otherwise low; and (3) a court setting the terms of the exchange would have a
difficult time doing so quickly and cheaply, given the specialized nature of the assets and
the varied and complex business environments in which the assets are deployed."); see
Dolak supra note 1, at 430 (noting that parties are "at the negotiation table ... to try to
avoid the substantial costs associated with patent litigation"); cf. Stuart J.H. Graham et al.,
High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent
Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1280-81, 1318 (2009) (finding ten percent of "ven-
ture-backed IT hardware [start-up companies] take a patent license solely to avoid or to
settle a patent dispute").
59. The median litigation cost to take a patent case, where there is $1-$25 million at
risk, through to the end of discovery is $1.5 million, and $2.5 million through the end of the
case. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW Ass'N, supra note 52, at 29.
60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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to settle the dispute privately and avoid the costs of litigation. ' '61 What,
then, is the root of such a mistake? As explained below, it is often the
very subject of the dispute-the patent itself-that is unclear. If the
boundaries of the patent are unclear, the parties may each reach indepen-
dent, rational, and yet radically different conclusions regarding the scope
and value of the patent. Put another way, the patent has failed to com-
municate critical information to the parties. This uncertainty leads to
bargaining breakdown. 62 This intractable uncertainty is exactly what de-
claratory relief is meant to address. 63
Of course, a declaratory relief action may be filed for reasons unrelated
to bargaining breakdown triggered by a good faith disagreement as to the
patent's scope. Such a suit may be filed with the intent of decreasing the
patent's market value to improve bargaining position or to intimidate the
patentee.64 Or a potential infringer may file suit-knowing that the
probability of success is low-in order to threaten the patentee's solvency
or to force the patentee out of the market.65 Some suits are filed merely
to secure a more favorable forum for the potential infringer.66 When un-
certainty surrounding the patent's scope and value is not driving the re-
quest for declaratory relief, granting such a request would not further the
goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act.67 In such instances, the court
should tread more carefully.
Obviously, at the moment a request for declaratory relief is filed, the
factual record is minimal and so it is not possible to definitively examine
the reasons behind the request and determine whether the patent's scope
is, in fact, uncertain. But, as discussed below, the likelihood that an un-
61. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 23, 28 (2009) (citing GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE
THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 50-51 (1980)).
62. Merges, supra note 16, at 89-91 (citing 4 KENNETH J. ARROW, The Economics of
Information, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW 224 (1984)); Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction?, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1749 (2009) ("[I]f a competitor thinks that a patent means one thing
and the patentee thinks it means something different, they are unlikely to be able to con-
clude a licensing transaction efficiently.").
63. Dolak, supra note 1, at 408-09.
64. See LaVanway, supra note 8, at 1975 & n.65; Lemley, supra note 57, at 1505 (not-
ing that suits can be used as settlement strategies, forcing the other side to the bargaining
table); see also Sony Elecs. Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing district court's conclusion that the suit was filed as "an intimidation tac-
tic" but reversing that court's denial of declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
65. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512-525 (2003) (describing opportunistic and
anti-competitive intellectual property lawsuits); Graham et al., supra note 58, at 1315
(describing "bullying" suits that attempt to put a start-up company out of business); Col-
leen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Liti-
gation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1587-88 (2009) (discussing "patent
predation" where established companies use patent litigation to impose distress on finan-
cially disadvantaged rivals).
66. See generally Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory
Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
67. See Dolak, supra note 1, at 408-09.
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just patent is causing bargaining breakdown differs by industry.68 There-
fore, even at this preliminary stage, courts should consider these
differences. Acknowledging these industry-specific characteristics is the
key to harnessing the court's discretionary exercise of declaratory relief
as a policy lever to promote both certainty and innovation.
II. UNJUST PATENTS, BARGAINING BREAKDOWN,
AND INNOVATION
When determining whether to accept or deny an action for declaratory
relief in a patent case, courts should consider both the patent itself and
the industry-specific nature of the patent system. These factors are im-
portant because some industries are more likely to produce patents with
broad, vague claims, which can make it particularly difficult for parties
negotiating over such a patent to resolve disputes on their own.69 This
uncertainty is exactly what the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed
to address.70
A. UNJUST PATENTS
For something to be "just" it must be fair and impartial. 71 For patents,
fairness and impartiality should be measured by the quality of informa-
tion they communicate to the public. 7 2 As stated by the Supreme Court,
68. See infra Part II.C.
69. See Dolak, supra note 1, at 408-09.
70. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 152.
71. See definitions supra note 12.
72. There is significant scholarship regarding the types of information patents
communicate:
First, patents tell the public what the inventor invented. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (set-
ting out the enablement, written description, and best mode requirements); CRAIG ALLEN
NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 49 (2008) (noting that patents must disclose "the invention to
persons having ordinary skill in the art ... to facilitate the dissemination of technical infor-
mation and follow-on innovation"); Fromer, supra note 14, at 560 ("[T]he patent document
is the principal way for an interested technologist to locate useful information about a
patented invention.").
Second, patents define the patentee's right to exclude. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (setting out
the definiteness requirement); NARD, supra, at 49 (noting that claims provide notice to the
public of the boundaries of the patentee's property rights); Christopher A. Cotropia, Pat-
ent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 49, 61-62 (2005) (patents are expected to clearly inform the public of the
subject matter that is protected by the patent and define the boundaries of the patentee's
right to exclude); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 349-50 (2007) (noting that patentees must know who is
infringing their claims and third parties must know whether their conduct will render them
liable for infringement); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2005) (noting that patents notify the public of the
patentee's exclusive rights).
Third, patents signal information about the companies that own them to potential inves-
tors. Graham et al., supra note 58, at 1303-09 (finding patent-holding is important to se-
curing venture investment); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 647-54
(2002) (noting patents can indicate a company's research trajectory, productivity, and inno-
vative activity).
Fourth, patents facilitate licensing. NARD, supra, at 30 (noting that patents reduce trans-
action costs and facilitate coordination efforts, "resulting in the patent efficiently ending up
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"[N]othing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the
public, than that the former should understand, and correctly describe,
just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent. '73 Unfortu-
nately, most modern patents miss this standard by a wide mark.7 4
Fundamentally, a patent describes an invention, erects a fence around
that invention, and grants the owner the right to exclude anyone else
from practicing that invention.75 When a patent clearly communicates
this information to the public, the public can learn about the invention,
design around it, or improve upon it. Additionally, competitors can avoid
liability for patent infringement, and the patentee can attract potential
partners and investors. 76 Unfortunately, throughout the patent applica-
tion process, several factors conspire to obscure the very information the
patent needs to communicate.
In order to obtain a patent, the applicant must prepare a patent appli-
cation and submit it to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). 77 Once received by the USPTO, the application is reviewed
by a patent examiner to see if the application complies with the statutory
requirements of patentability: subject matter,78 utility,79 novelty,8 0 obvi-
in the hands of the party who is best suited to bring the technology to market"); Dan L.
Burk & Brent H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property
Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 585 ("Licensees need only
look at the patent to determine whether the information will be valuable to them."); see
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276
(1977) (presenting the "prospect theory" of patents and arguing that the patentee will co-
ordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent's value).
Fifth, patents teach the public important technical information. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bi-
cron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (Patent disclosures add to the "general store of knowl-
edge" and "stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in
the art."); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
621, 624 (2010) (noting that the patent document itself can serve as a form of "technical"
literature and add to the "storehouse of knowledge").
Lastly, patents can express the government's view regarding what societal norms ought
to be. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 573,
581 (2006) (arguing that "[g]ranting patents on genes related to sexual orientation ...
communicates government approval that [homosexuals] are pathological and should be
cured").
73. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1876) (emphasis added); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (requiring claims to "particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject mat-
ter which the applicant regards as his invention")
74. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 46.
75. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (setting forth patent disclosure requirements); id. § 271 (defin-
ing patent infringement); see also Fromer, supra note 14, at 545-46.
76. Fromer, supra note 14, at 549-50.
77. MUELLER, supra note 4, at 42.
78. Patentable subject matter is "any ... process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any ... improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
79. Patents are granted only for useful inventions. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35
U.S.C. § 101.
80. Patents are granted only for inventions that are new. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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ousness,8 1 and written description. 82 The applicant's goals throughout
this process are twofold. First, provide the minimum amount of informa-
tion necessary to meet these statutory requirements because disclosing
too much information, or using the wrong words, can restrict the scope of
the patent. 83 Second, employ broad or ambiguous language to cover a
wide array of potentially infringing activity to maximize possible infringe-
ment opportunities. 84 The application process is completely ex parte,
which gives the applicant every incentive to engage in puffing and decep-
tion to achieve these goals. 85 Indeed, as early as 1886, the Supreme Court
acknowledged this problem, lamenting "[s]ome persons seem to suppose
that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax, which may be turned and
twisted in any direction ... so as to make it include something more than,
or something different from, what its words express. '8 6 While examiners
are supposed to guard against such vagueness and ambiguity, the system
clearly favors the applicants.8 7 Any doubts as to patentability are re-
81. Patents are granted only for inventions that are not obvious improvements on ex-
isting knowledge. Id. § 103.
82. Patents must disclose a written description of the invention, the manner and pro-
cess of making and using the invention (i.e., enablement), the best mode of carrying out
the invention, and distinctly claim the invention. Id. § 112.
83. See Seymore, supra note 72, at 635 (noting "several linguistic pitfalls ... paten-
tee[s] must evade . . . to avoid a narrow claim construction"); see also Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 123, 133 (2005) (noting that Federal Circuit's claim construction jurispru-
dence has "embraced harsh estoppels and evidentiary exclusions that should be viewed as
suspect").
84. Fromer, supra note 14, at 658 (patentee's goal is to maximize legal protection). To
guard against the possibility that broad claim language will be invalidated, applicants also
include progressively narrower dependent claims that refer back to the broader indepen-
dent claim while adding more limitations. Seymore, supra note 72, at 633 (patent applica-
tion drafter wants claims that are easily infringed); see also MUELLER, supra note 4, at
84-86.
85. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (describing the "highly developed
art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as possible-
while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible"); BESSEN & MEURER, supra
note 25, at 57 (noting that applicants draft "ambiguous patent claims that can be read
narrowly during examination" and "broadly during litigation"); Seymore, supra note 72, at
633 ("[P]atentees intentionally draft ambiguous claims in an effort to expand their patent
rights as far as possible."); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecu-
tion, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 180 (2007) ("Patent applicants have an incentive to keep
issued patent claims vague because vagueness allows for ex post gaming.").
86. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886). Some of this uncertainty is inherent in
the process of describing new, complex and unfamiliar technologies in words. BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 25, at 55; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 27 (noting that indeter-
minacy "may well be inherent in the process of mapping words to things"); Robin Feld-
man, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289, 296 (2009) (noting that
patent drafting is particularly challenging because existing language must "describe some-
thing that did not exist when the language was developed" and "[l]anguage will always be
subject to varying interpretations"); Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1752 ("[P]atents
cover new scientific terminology that doesn't have a fixed meaning in the art, so ... scien-
tists in the field can reasonably disagree over the meaning of those terms.").
87. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 56 ("The game is stacked in favor of inven-
tors and against examiners and the public.").
For example, while applicants must submit relevant prior art that they are aware of, the
applicant has no affirmative obligation to search for information that might reflect poorly
on the application. See Lemly, supra note 57, at 1499-1500; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note
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solved in favor of the applicant, and examiners are rewarded for expedi-
ent disposal of applications and allowance is encouraged.88
The problem of vague and ambiguous patents could be ameliorated
somewhat by the courts, but there are several reasons why the courts are
also unable to adequately police patent boundaries. First, judicial inter-
pretation of patent claims in litigation is extremely unpredictable. 89 In
fact, approximately forty percent of district court decisions interpreting
patent claims contain at least one wrongly-construed claim term.90 Sec-
ond, even though the patent statute requires applicants to particularly
point out and distinctly claim their invention, this requirement is not rig-
61, at 23. This means, for example, that the applicant has no obligation to search for infor-
mation that might show that the purported invention has already been invented by some-
one else or that might demonstrate that the purported invention would be obvious to
anyone with ordinary skill in the art. This kind of information is not easy to find and as
one might expect, few applicants voluntarily perform these kinds of searches. See Lemley,
supra note 57, at 1500.
88. Seymore, supra note 15, at 151-52; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 23 (Patent
examiners' "incentive is to dispose of cases as quickly as possible."); see also Risch, supra
note 85, at 180 ("Patent examiners have an incentive to issue valid patents; since the ques-
tion for examiners is whether the claims are valid, they have no incentive to clarify vague
patents if the claims otherwise appear valid."). Patent examiners spend an average of eigh-
teen hours per application. Lemley, supra note 57, at 1500; see also BURK & LEMLEY,
supra note 61, at 24-25. (noting that the "unlimited number of do-overs means that the
error costs of the patent system are systematically skewed in an applicant's favor"). Over
70% of patent applications issue as patents. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is
the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 193 (2008). But see BURK & LEM-
LEY, supra note 61, at 25 (discussing reform efforts by the USPTO in recent years).
89. The process of determining the meaning and scope of a patent claim in litigation is
called claim construction. AMY L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW 257 (2008).
The rules governing claim construction are in flux and their implementation by individual
judges is highly variable. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 58-60 (noting that the
Federal Circuit has not formulated a predictable method of claim interpretation); BURK &
LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 27 (noting that judges "define an element almost arbitrarily, and
even when judges disagree as to the proper definition they offer no principled basis for
doing so"); Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1762 ("Claim construction is sufficiently
uncertain that many parties don't settle a case until after the court has construed the
claims, because there is no baseline for agreement on what the patent might possibly
cover."); see Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2009) ("On multiple levels, courts struggle to assess the mean-
ing of claim terms and the consequent scope of the right to exclude. The construction of
the literal meaning of a claim is rife with uncertainty."); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Applera Corp., 605 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Plager, J., dissenting) ("The court
now spends a substantial amount of judicial resources trying to make sense of unclear,
overbroad, and sometimes incoherent claim terms."). But see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim
Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1033, 1037-39 (2007) (questioning whether district courts are reversed more frequently on
claim construction than on other issues).
90. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Pre-
dictable?, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239 (2005) (finding that in 37.5% of the cases
studied, the Federal Circuit held at least one term was wrongly construed); see also David
L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal
Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 248-49 (2008) (finding 32.5% of claim terms
were "wrongly" construed, by the lower court, 38.2% of district court cases had at least one
term wrongly construed, and 29.7% of district court cases had to be reversed, vacated, and/
or remanded because of an erroneous claim construction).
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orously enforced.91 This has led one Federal Circuit judge to complain
that even claims made of "quicksand" can pass muster.92 Third, patent
law allows the scope of a patent's claim to expand to include technology
that did not exist at the time the patent application was filed.93 This
means that what the patent covers is purposely allowed to change and
expand over time, possibly encompassing technology the inventor had
never conceived of at the time the invention was invented.94 All of these
factors make it difficult to ascertain a patent's scope ex ante, short of
litigating it to a non-appealable decision. 95 This reality further encour-
ages applicants to game the patent prosecution process to yield patents
that can be twisted and stretched to cover whatever technology the paten-
tee wants it to cover.
In sum, a patent with vague or ambiguous claims is unjust and unfair.
Such claims do not provide the public with fair notice of the patent's
scope, which means that the public does not know what the inventor in-
vented and the boundaries of the patentee's right to exclude.96 As ex-
plained in the next section, when parties attempt to bargain over such
patents, uncertainty leads to bargaining breakdown, thereby impeding
innovation.97
B. How UNJUST PATENTS LEAD TO BARGAINING BREAKDOWN
The main reason we issue patents is to encourage innovation.98 Patents
encourage innovation by facilitating the transformation of the inventions
91. This requirement is referred to as the definiteness requirement. 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2006). The Federal Circuit has stated that a claim is indefinite only if the claim "is in-
solubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly be adopted." Exxon Re-
search & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (2001). Only 5.8% of 138 invalid
patents in the studied sample were invalidated on claim indefiniteness. John R. Allison &
Mark Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
208 (1998); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 57.
92. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 605 F.3d at 1349 ("It is time for us to move beyond sticking
our fingers in the never ending leaks in the dike that supposedly defines and figuratively
surrounds a claimed invention. Instead, we might spend some time figuring out how to
support the PTO in requiring that the walls surrounding the claimed invention be made of
something other than quicksand.").
93. Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MIcH. L. REv. 523, 524-27 (2010);
Holbrook, supra note 89, at 14 ("[I]f the accused device is close enough to be considered
effectively the same as the claimed invention, then there is still infringement."); BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 25, at 61-62. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising"
Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 151 (2005).
94. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 67.
95. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 28 ("The only way to find out whether a
patent covers what you are doing is to go to ... the appeals court.").
96. Many scholars have suggested ways to improve patent disclosure. See, e.g.,
Fromer, supra note 14, at 564-88 (2009) (proposing, inter alia, marking layers of the patent
document, requiring dynamic models and improving the index); Seymore, supra note 15, at
156 (proposing prima facie non-enablement if applicant fails to provide working examples
in disclosure); Note, supra note 72, at 2027 (suggesting that applicants disclose source code
and provide summaries).
97. See infra Part II.C.
98. Fromer, supra note 14, at 547 ("It is well-accepted that the principal goal of the
American patent system is to stimulate innovation."); see also NARD, supra note 72, at
28-30 (referring to the incentive to innovate, along with the incentive to invent and the
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described within them into commercial products.99 To perform this func-
tion effectively, the patent must clearly communicate information about
the invention and the scope of the patent to potential investors, licensors,
manufacturers, developers, and distributors. 100
Unjust patents do not clearly communicate this information and make
it more difficult for the patentee to commercialize the invention and
know who to approach for help.1° 1 In addition, potential partners, inves-
tors, and licensees are not able to know if the commercial arrangement
being offered by the patentee is a good fit for their business. 102 Uncer-
tainty causes bargaining breakdown, preventing commercialization of the
patent. 103
Unjust patents, and the bargaining breakdown that accompanies them,
also have deleterious effects on the innovative activities of would-be com-
petitors and follow-on inventors.10 4 When patent boundaries are unclear,
other companies cannot accurately predict whether their own develop-
ment activities will infringe upon another's patent and thus must always
consider the possibility of being sued for inadvertent infringement.10 5
incentive to disclose as the three major economic theories for the existence of a patent
system).
99. Fromer, supra note 14, at 547 n.31; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 30. Of
course, there is considerable debate regarding how successfully patents perform this
function.
100. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31
(2002) ("The [patent] monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its bounda-
ries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it enables effi-
cient investment in innovation."); Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure
in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 402 (2010) (noting that patent disclosure facili-
tates efficient bargaining by clarifying property rights); Graham et al., supra note 58, at
1317-18 (finding that in general, biotechnology start-up companies license patents to ac-
quire knowledge); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 30.
101. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 28 ("If a patentee cannot know what her
patent covers or whether it is valid, she cannot know who to license or sue."); see also
NARD, supra note 72, at 30 (noting that patents reduce transactions costs and facilitate
coordination efforts, "resulting in the patent efficiently ending up in the hands of the party
who is best suited to bring the technology to market").
102. See Devlin, supra note 100, at 439-40 (noting that where property rights are diffi-
cult to identify and construe efficient contractual bargaining is difficult).
103. See Merges, supra note 16, at 84-91 (discussing examples of bargaining breakdown
involving patents).
104. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Re-
ducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 999 (1999) (arguing that uncertainty and delay due to
patent litigation induce limited interim infringement and eliminate a substantial portion of
the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing).
105. Parties can be liable for infringement even if they invented independently or made
good faith efforts to design around the patent. Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946
F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted) ("[T]here is no intent element to direct
infringement."); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 124 ("[T]he more a firm invests in
technology, the more it inadvertently exposes itself to patents of which it is not aware.");
see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 28 ("[A] company that wants to sell a new
product in the [Information Technology] space cannot know who will assert a patent
against it, whether that patent is one that really should have issued, or whether the patent
actually covers what they are doing.").
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But, although the potential monies at risk are tremendous, 10 6 many com-
panies simply ignore others' patents. 10 7 In some industries, the numbers
of patents that must be evaluated and the fact that many of those patents
are unjust, make the costs of investigating, identifying, and clearing these
rights ex ante prohibitive.' 08 Instead, companies take a "wait and see"
approach, hoping that a patent owner does not emerge claiming infringe-
ment.10 9 Yet even once an infringement suit is threatened, many compa-
nies continue to ignore the threat and only rarely withdraw or redesign
accused products.110 How can accused infringers take such a cavalier atti-
tude towards potential infringement? They can do so because the scope
and value of the patent is so indeterminate that they know that even a
diligent assessment of the patent and fair-minded negotiations with the
patentee are unlikely to lead to a mutually agreeable and commercially
viable solution."' The accused infringer cannot determine the scope and
the value of the patent ex ante, so rather than resolve the dispute pri-
vately, he takes his chances in court and hopes that he can avoid infringe-
ment or invalidate the patent. 112 All of this litigation is extremely
expensive and, in many cases, exceeds the net profits attributable to the
106. The mean defendant in an infringement case loses 3% of his market value, or $28.7
million, upon the filing of an infringement suit against him. BESSEN & MEURER, supra
note 25, at 135-37.
107. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 21-23. The possi-
bility of being liable for willful infringement also creates a strong incentive not to read
patents. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-01 (2003) (explaining that "any time an individual or
company learns of a patent that might be relevant to its products, the company is in
trouble"). Companies can be liable for willful infringement if they learn of a patent and
are objectively reckless in responding to it. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
108. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 70. Modern products are made of hundreds,
if not thousands, of components. Because patent boundaries are so malleable, a product is
potentially covered by thousands, if not tens of thousands, of different patent rights, all of
which must be evaluated and dealt with. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 27. Schol-
ars have dubbed these nests of overlapping patent rights "patent thickets." Ian Ayres &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REv. 863, 869-76 (2007) (ex-
plaining patent thickets and noting that they are especially problematic in the software,
Internet, and semiconductor industries); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 26.
Indeed, one estimate suggests that a modern e-commerce company needs to be concerned
with approximately 11,000 patents with an estimated cost of clearance pegged at $5,000 per
patent. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 213. These staggering costs deter most com-
panies from performing clearance checks. Id. at 70 ("There is abundant evidence that
many technology firms... invest little in patent search and clearance."); BURK & LEMLEY,
supra note 61, at 32.
109. Lemley, supra note 107, at 22.
110. Id.
111. See Devlin, supra note 100, at 409 ("Potential infringers and patentees can bargain
efficiently ex ante to ensure that resources are devoted to their highest value uses only if
property rights are clear."); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1749 ("[I]f a compet-
itor thinks that a patent means one thing and the patentee thinks it means something dif-
ferent, they are unlikely to be able to conclude a licensing transaction efficiently.").
112. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 32; Lemley, supra note 107, at 32-33; see also
Devlin, supra note 100, at 440 (noting that it can be particularly difficult to bargain where
an innocent company accidentally infringes a patent and has devoted considerable invest-
ment into commercializing its infringing product).
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relevant patents.1 13 Companies must take this significant risk into ac-
count when deciding how much to invest in a particular technology,
which in turn may discourage investment in wide bands of technology
where the anticipated benefits do not outweigh the considerable costs.114
C. THE EXTENT OF BARGAINING BREAKDOWN IS INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC
It is important to understand, however, that unjust patents-and the
bargaining breakdowns that accompany them-are not prevalent to the
same degree in each industry and that their effect on innovation also de-
pends on the characteristics of a particular industry.'1 5 Accordingly,
these differences should be taken into account when considering how to
address bargaining breakdowns and communication failures."16
First of all, it is important to realize that certain technologies can be
more easily defined in a patent than others. For example, DNA se-
quences are clearly identified by their order of nucleotide bases. 117 Simi-
larly, an inventor who invents a new molecule can describe that molecule
using its unique chemical formula. Since these inventions can be clearly
defined, it is easier to determine whether the invention is novel or in-
fringed." 8 Patents of this type are common in the chemical and pharma-
ceutical industries. 119
Consider how much more difficult it is to describe a business method
or software invention than a molecule. a20 Broadly characterized,
software is nothing more than a set of machine-readable instructions ca-
pable of performing a particular task.12' Moreover, software inventions
perform calculations and manipulate data in ways that cannot be easily
perceived by people, especially not without access to human-readable
source code or other documentation. 22 Because a tangible manifestation
of a software invention is not necessarily evident, it is easier to obtain
113. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 145.
114. Id. ("[P]atents today constitute a brake on innovation."); cf. Fromer, supra note
14, at 547 (noting that "innovative rivalry" is more beneficial to society).
115. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1760; Graham et al., supra note 58, at 1326
(finding "deep difference" in the use and utility of patents by start-ups across industries);
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 93 (patents' effect on innovation varies by industry);
see also NARD, supra note 72, at 56 ("Each industry has its own norms and customs, each
relies on the patent system to varying degrees .... ").
116. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1674 (2003) ("It is important not just to make patent policy intelligently, but to tailor
it to specific industries.").
117. Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1760.
118. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 107.
119. Id. at 152.
120. Id. at 67 ("[A]bstract patent claims are particularly endemic to computer-related
patents."); Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1760.
121. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 77 (3d ed. 2009); MPEP § 2106.01(I) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July
2010) ("[A] computer program is merely a set of instructions capable of being executed by
a computer .... ").
122. Burk & Lemley, supra note 116, at 1690-91.
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patent claims subject to shifting and expansive interpretations. 123 This
becomes a particular problem as technology advances. 124 For example, if
a software patent written in 1999 claims a set of instructions to be exe-
cuted by a "central processing unit," does that patent cover calculations
performed by a smartphone developed in 2012?125 The difficulty of
describing business method and software inventions means that these
kinds of patents lead to bargaining breakdowns and cause communication
failures that are more likely to result in litigation than patents in other
technology groups.126
Perceptions of a patent's value are also affected by industry differences
in the way patents are mapped with products. Complex systems that
combine numerous components covered by multiple, interrelated patents
are particularly common in the computer and electronics industries. 127
Because distribution of the entire system can be stymied by a patent that
covers only one small feature of the total package, the value of each indi-
vidual patent is distorted. 128 For a recent example, consider the patent
infringement suit brought against Microsoft Corporation by a small
software company named i4i Limited.129 The patentee alleged that the
custom XML editor feature in Microsoft Word infringed its patent and,
using a royalty rate that valued this feature more than the price of some
versions of Microsoft Word,130 was awarded $240 million in damages. 1 3
Microsoft was also permanently enjoined from selling Microsoft Word
with this infringing feature. 132 Patentees in similar situations can thus en-
gage in "patent holdup" by demanding royalties that far exceed the indi-
vidual value of the patented feature.1 33 By contrast, in the chemical and
pharmaceutical industry, a single patent normally covers a single prod-
123. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 201-03; Devlin, supra note 100, at 410 (not-
ing that Information Technology patents convey little information and are notoriously
vague).
124. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 200 ("[T]he progress of technology will
render [mapping of words in a claim to a set of technologies] increasingly uncertain over
time.").
125. See F. Russell Denton, Plumb Lines Instead of a Wrecking Ball: A Model for Re-
calibrating Patent Scope, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 8 (2008) (identifying "central processing
unit" as an abstract term commonly found in software patents); see also BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 25, at 194 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643 (filed Jan. 10, 1983))
(identifying "point of sale location" and "material object" as abstract terms).
126. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 152-53.
127. Id. at 107-08; Burk & Lemley, supra note 116, at 1591 (noting that semiconductor
products can incorporate thousands of different inventions).
128. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1991-93 (2007); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 29; see also Ayres &
Parchomovsky, supra note 108, at 872-73 (explaining how patent thickets lead to holdout
problems).
129. See generally i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 647 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010).
130. Id. at 853 (using a $98 royalty rate to calculate damages even though Microsoft
argued that this rate was exorbitant given that certain Word products only cost $97).
131. Id. at 839.
132. Id.
133. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 160; Graham et al., supra note 58, at 1319
(complex technologies may increase transactions costs associated with commercialization
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uct.134 It is much easier to reach an agreement regarding the value of an
individual patent when that patent only covers one product.135
D. INNOVATION IS INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC
Different industries also innovate differently. Some industries, like the
pharmaceutical industry, are characterized by slow, non-cumulative inno-
vation. 136 Development of a new drug can take a decade or more and
cost hundreds of millions of dollars.1 37 There are complicated federal
statutes and regulations that industry players must abide by, which fur-
ther slows market entry.1 38 "Once a drug is developed and tested, it
tends not to be improved. 1 39 Because potential inventors in the pharma-
ceutical industry are not looking to build upon existing inventions, the
likelihood that an existing patent is blocking follow-on innovation is
low. 140 In this kind of an industry, strong, broad patent rights will not
impede innovation, and in fact, are necessary to give inventors the oppor-
tunity to recoup their substantial up-front investment.1 41
The picture in other industries is much different. The software industry
innovates cumulatively.1 42 Software inventions are generally modifica-
tions and improvements of existing technology. 143 Software products also
develop at a rapid pace. 144 It takes less money to develop a new software
and costs of clearance); see also Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 108, at 871-72 (ex-
plaining how patent thickets raise information costs and negotiation costs).
134. Burk & Lemley, supra note 116, at 1591.
135. This is not to imply that it is an easy thing to do. Henry E. Smith has cataloged
various reasons why patents inherently give rise to greater information costs. Henry E.
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE
L.J. 1742, 1801-03 (2007) (explaining that inventions protected by patent law are often
subject to multiple unforeseeable uses, the range of actions taken to increase the value of
the patent is large, and the contribution of a patent to an overall product is very difficult to
measure).
136. Cotropia, supra note 93, at 196.
137. Burk & Lemley, supra note 116, at 1581-82.
138. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 33. In order for a generic drug manufacturer
to enter the market, it must follow the procedures set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act of
1984. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
For a discussion of the applicable procedures, see Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala.
140 F.3d 1060, 1063-65 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
139. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 47.
140. Cotropia, supra note 93, at 190.
141. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 80-81 (noting that pharmaceutical innovation
would drop substantially without effective patent protection). But see Cynthia M. Ho &
Ann Weilbaecher, Patents versus Patients: Must We Choose?, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. i, i-iv
(2009) (questioning whether patents are essential for pharmaceutical innovation and argu-
ing that patent profits have created a disproportionate focus on drugs that have mass ap-
peal, the potential to generate large profits, and an overabundance of drugs that all treat
the same condition).
142. Cotropia, supra note 93, at 188.
143. Id.; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 47 ("The expectation is that [software] will
be incrementally improved over time.").
144. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 57 (noting that by the time a patent is filed,
issued and enforced "the software industry has moved on").
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product, so new technologies come to the market quickly and often.145
The rapid, cumulative nature of innovation in the software industry re-
sults in fast turnover of products in the market, each building upon the
one before. 46 In such an industry, patents of indeterminate scope are a
particular drag on innovation because they can cover several generations
of product improvements. 147 Accordingly, software patents typify the
kind of patents that should be clearly and narrowly defined so that poten-
tial inventors are not deterred from improving upon existing technology
and the patentee's reward is commensurate with her contribution. 148
The ability of patents to communicate clearly and effectively is, in
many ways, dependent on the kind of technology claimed. Unjust patents
are less common in industries where the technology can be uniquely de-
scribed. Patent value is easier to ascertain in industries where patents
correspond to single products. Precise patent boundaries are particularly
important in industries characterized by rapid, cumulative innovation.
This suggests that bargaining breakdown also has industry-specific char-
acteristics. Accordingly, any proposal to address bargaining breakdowns
should take these characteristics into consideration.
III. USING DECLARATORY RELIEF TO INTERVENE WHEN
BARGAINING BREAKS DOWN
There are several approaches one might take to address bargaining
breakdowns. We can improve the clarity of the patent document itself by
implementing more concrete patent disclosure requirements 49 or by re-
quiring patents to disclose a working example.1 50 We could try to im-
prove the predictability of patent claim interpretation in the courts by
increasing the deference the Federal Circuit gives to lower courts' claim
construction rulings 15' or by establishing specialized patent district
courts.15 2 What all of these solutions have in common is that they require
Congress, the courts, or the USPTO to affirmatively change the status
quo. They also do not address uncertainty and bargaining breakdowns
145. Cotropia, supra note 93, at 193; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 40 (noting that
a new software product takes considerably less time to develop than a new drug or
microprocessor and that automated processes are available to help develop software).
146. Cotropia, supra note 93, at 193.
147. Id. at 196.
148. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 159 (noting that software patents "should be
narrow and ... should not generally extend across several product generations for fear of
stifling subsequent incremental improvements"); Cotropia, supra note 93, at 196 ("Seeing
existing patentees' possible coverage of later-developed technologies, potential subsequent
developers may choose to forgo melding new developments with existing technologies.").
149. Fromer, supra note 14, at 580-85.
150. Seymore, supra note 72, at 641-42.
151. The current standard of review for claim constructions rulings is de novo. BESSEN
& MEURER, supra note 25, at 237-38.
152. Id. at 238.
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presently occurring due to unjust patents that have already issued. 153
This Article argues that courts already have a potent tool that can be used
right now to address unjust patents that are leading to bargaining break-
down: the power to grant or withhold declaratory relief.
A. TAILORING DECLARATORY RELIEF BY
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Given the marked difference between industries, courts "should apply
the general rules of patent law with sensitivity to the characteristics of
particular industries. ' 154 Indeed, patent law is already differentiated by
technology type. 155 For example, the written-description requirement is
more stringent for biotechnology inventions than for software inven-
tions.156 More proof of utility is required in applications seeking to pro-
tect gene markers than for other types of inventions. 157 In this vein,
scholars have proposed various industry-specific policy levers that can be
used to further the goals of the patent system, such as tailoring injunctive
relief to certain industries 58 and tailoring the doctrine of equivalents to
rapidly developing industries. 159
This Article identifies an important new policy lever that can be tai-
lored in an industry-specific fashion to effectively promote innovation.
Specifically, this Article argues that courts should use their discretion to
accept more declaratory judgment cases in industries where patents are
more likely to be unjust and where unjust patents are more likely to lead
to bargaining breakdown. 160 In such industries, expansive court interven-
tion is justified because indeterminate patents impede both private dis-
pute resolution and technological innovation.
153. Scholars have argued that liability rules in patent law can operate as a safety valve
to mitigate the effects of patent uncertainty. Holbrook, supra note 89, at 46-48; Smith,
supra note 135, at 1818-19.
154. Burk & Lemley, supra note 116, at 1641. There are a variety of ways to select
patents belonging to various industries. Chien, supra note 65, at 1593. The National Bu-
reau of Economic Research has divided patents into six main technology categories: Com-
puters and Communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronics, Chemical,
Mechanical and Others. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe, & Manuel Trajtenberg, The
NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 1 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), available at http://papers.nber.org/
papers/w8498.pdf. Or one could categorize patents based on company or by the patent's
USPTO classification. Chien, supra note 65, at 1593-96.
155. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 246; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 59.
156. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 59-60. But see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that all patents must comply with
written description requirement).
157. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 60.
158. Id. at 138.
159. Cotropia, supra note 93, at 192.
160. It is beyond the scope of this Article to recommend specific outcomes for the de-
claratory relief cases courts accept. Instead, this Article posits that certain industries suffer
bargaining breakdown due to unjust patents more often than others and that these indus-
tries will benefit from early, frequent court intervention to clarify patent rights, no matter
the ultimate decision regarding validity or infringement of the patent under consideration.
See infra Part II.C.
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B. THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY: ACCEPT MORE CASES
The software industry has a particular problem with patents of indeter-
minate scope, not just because they are so common but also because such
patents have an outsized effect on software innovation. 161 These
problems make it more difficult for parties to resolve licensing disputes
on their own and it is especially important for courts to clarify patent
scope. Accordingly, courts should use their discretion to accept more de-
claratory relief actions arising from software patent disputes.
First, as explained above, the prevalence of abstract claims in software
patents militates for frequent court intervention because bargaining
breakdown is more likely when the scope of the patent is uncertain. 162
There are other characteristics of the software industry that further com-
plicate private resolution of patent disputes. A high number of software
patents are asserted by entities that do not make anything.163 Such enti-
ties are only seeking to extract royalties and are not interested in a cross-
license.164 Royalty demands are often inflated because software products
have multiple components and can be blocked by a patent that covers
only one small feature of the total package. 165 Because each party has
markedly different perceptions of the value of the patent, court adjudica-
tion will often be necessary because it will be that much more difficult to
resolve the matter privately. 166
Frequent court intervention is also beneficial to the software industry
as a whole because software innovation is quite susceptible to the detri-
mental effects of unjust patents. Because the software industry is charac-
terized by rapid, cumulative innovation, patentees often "imaginatively
161. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 187-94; Devlin, supra note 100, at 403 (not-
ing that patents in the IT industry are "notorious for their vague language"). But see An-
drew Chin, On Abstraction and Equivalence in Software Patent Doctrine: A Response to
Bessen, Meurer and Klemens, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 197, 200 (2009) (arguing that the
abstract nature of software does not necessarily pose patent scope problems).
162. See supra Part I.B; Merges, supra note 16, at 89.
163. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 139. These entities are called "nonpracticing
entities" or "patent trolls." Chien, supra note 65, at 1579-81 (describing "nonpracticing
entities" and noting that they historically focused on high-tech inventions). One study
found that nonpracticing entities brought thirty percent of suits involving software patents
(based on number of defendants sued). Id. at 1601-02. For a recent example, Interval
Licensing LLC (a nonpracticing entity owned by Microsoft Corp. co-founder Paul Allen)
sued eleven technology companies, including Google, Facebook, eBay, and Apple, for al-
legedly infringing four of its software and internet-related patents. E.g., Dionne Searcey,
Microsoft Founder Launches Patent War, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2010, at Al; Jennifer Va-
lentino-DeVries, The Paul Allen Suit: A Look at the Patents, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2010,
5:56 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/08/27/the-paul-allen-suit-a-look-at-the-patents/;
Dennis Crouch, Interval Licensing v. AOL, Apple, eBay, Facebook, Google, etc., PA-
TENTLY-O (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/interval-licensing-v-
aol-apple-ebay-facebook-google-etc.html.
164. Chien, supra note 65, at 1579 (noting that NPEs cannot be countersued for in-
fringement and that their core business is patent enforcement); BURK & LEMLEY, supra
note 61, at 56-57.
165. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 128, at 1991; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 29.
166. Merges, supra note 16, at 89; Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1749 ("[I]f a com-
petitor thinks that a patent means one thing and the patentee thinks it means something
different, they are unlikely to be able to conclude a licensing transaction efficiently.").
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reinterpret[ ]" their patents to cover new and unforeseen products. 167 By
stretching their patents in this way, patentees increase the uncertainty
surrounding the patents' scope and value, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of bargaining breakdown. In addition, the pace and type of innova-
tion in this industry make it particularly important to resolve patent
disputes quickly and clarify patent boundaries so as not to inhibit follow-
on inventors. 168 Thus when patentees broadly assert software patents of
indeterminate scope, these industry characteristics amplify the resulting
negative effects and impede innovation. This makes it especially impor-
tant for courts to intervene in order to guard against this kind of
behavior.
In sum, when a declaratory relief action is filed over a software patent,
it is probably because the parties cannot successfully conclude the bar-
gaining process because of a disagreement over what the patent covers
and the value of that patent.169 This disagreement is likely due to the
patent's inability to clearly communicate critical information to the par-
ties. Furthermore, given the costs involved, a potential patent infringer in
this industry who brings an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act is
likely signaling to the court that the patent's boundaries are uncertain
enough to be impeding commercially significant innovative activity. This
kind of intractable uncertainty is exactly what the Declaratory Judgment
Act was enacted to resolve.
C. SAFETY VALVE
If courts use their discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act to
clarify patent scope in those industries where vague and ambiguous pat-
ents are most problematic, significant efficiencies will be created regard-
less of the ultimate outcome of the suit. If the patent is found valid and
infringed, then the patentee will be afforded the remedies justly owed to
167. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 57 (citing Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley,
Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2001)); Burk &
Lemley, supra note 62, at 1762 (noting risk that patentees can creatively interpret claims to
own inventions they did not have in mind when they wrote the claims); see Valentino-
DeVries, supra note 163 (describing two of the four patents at issue in a patent infringe-
ment suit filed by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen and noting how broad the scope of
those patents might be). A substantial number of suits involving high-tech patents be-
tween public companies involve firms that are not market competitors or even technologi-
cally close. Chien, supra note 65, at 1607.
168. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 61, at 57, 156-57, 159 (discussing the speed and cu-
mulative nature of technological advancement in the software industry); Cotropia, supra
note 93, at 188.
169. Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1749 ("[I]f a competitor thinks that a patent
means one thing and the patentee thinks it means something different, they are unlikely to
be able to conclude a licensing transaction efficiently."); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra
note 61, at 28 ("The only way to find out whether a patent covers what you are doing is to
go to court."); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 157, 191 (noting that software patents
are "particularly prone to notice problems" and providing data that shows high relative
frequency of claim construction issues with software patents); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note
61, at 58 (noting that in the software industry "the central issue in a patent lawsuit is figur-
ing out what the patent actually covers").
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her, and subsequent parties will know how to avoid the patent and be
able to divert their resources into valuable design-around activities. 170 If
the patent is invalidated, then an impediment to innovation will have
been removed, and the public will be free to conduct research and devel-
opment activities in this area. Either way, declaratory relief clears the
path for follow-on innovation; thus, expansive use of this remedy can help
maintain the proper balance between our interest in rewarding the inven-
tor and our interest in protecting third parties from uncertainty. In this
way, expansive grants of declaratory relief can work as a "safety valve" to
mitigate the negative effects of uncertainty caused by unjust patents. 171
D. IMPLEMENTATION
To use declaratory relief as an effective policy lever, courts must recog-
nize that the patents themselves are often causing uncertainty and bar-
gaining breakdown that needs to be resolved through declaratory relief
and that the adverse effects of this uncertainty are more acute in some
industries than others. Courts need to be more willing to grant declara-
tory relief in industries characterized by abstract technology and rapid,
cumulative innovation because patent scope is more likely to be uncer-
tain and because it is more likely that this uncertainty is blocking follow-
on innovation. Thus, both the goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act and
the patent system justify expansive grants of declaratory relief in such
industries. Courts should make these goals explicit in their analyses to
encourage the development of better policy and better judicial decision-
making. First, a district court's exercise of judicial discretion is not re-
viewed de novo but rather under the abuse of discretion standard.172
Thus, district courts can better insulate their decisions from reversal by
making their policy considerations explicit.173 Second, making these con-
siderations explicit increases the predictability of judicial decision-making
ex ante. 174 Moreover, if courts make clear that they are using the goals of
the Declaratory Judgment Act and the patent system to inform their deci-
sions, both judges and litigants will be compelled to carefully consider
these important issues. 175 Once sufficient precedent is established, third
parties will also be able to conform their behavior to these same goals.
All of this may promote clearer patent disclosure during the patent appli-
170. Cf. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the patent system works to
the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional
purpose.").
171. Cf. Holbrook, supra note 89, at 46-48 (explaining how liability rules may act to
mitigate uncertainty surrounding patent scope).
172. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995).
173. Dolak, supra note 1, at 433.
174. Id. at 433-34.
175. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to catalogue all the ways declara-
tory relief could be used to advance important policy goals, as another example, judges and
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cation process as well as increase the pressure for more systemic reform
to address patent disclosure problems.
CONCLUSION
Modern patents are often vague and ambiguous. Such patents are un-
just because they do not give the public fair notice of the patents' scope
and boundaries. When a patent's scope is unclear, both commercializa-
tion of the invention described in the patent and follow-on innovation are
hampered because interested parties are unable to negotiate a mutually
agreeable solution. This uncertainty can lead to litigation and requests
for declaratory relief. When analyzing these requests for declaratory re-
lief, courts must recognize that they can use their discretion under the
Declaratory Judgment Act to effectively address the uncertainty caused
by unjust patents and create efficiencies that will foster innovation. To
use this tool successfully, courts must focus on the nature of the patent-in-
dispute and consider that, in some industries, it is more likely that the
patent itself is preventing the parties from negotiating to a mutually
agreeable solution. Expansive grants of declaratory relief in such indus-
tries are justified because vetting these kinds of patents through an im-
partial decision maker resolves uncertainty, facilitating private dispute
resolution and furthering innovation. Thus, explicitly using this discretion
as a policy lever hews to both the goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act
and the patent system. By making these goals explicit in their considera-
tion of declaratory relief actions, courts can address the recalcitrant prob-
lem of uncertainty in the patent system, thereby promoting fairness and
innovation.
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